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Welfare evaluations and reform recommendations  in many
studies  may need  to be reworked,  to account  for the possibility
that  the quota  license  market-  usually  assumed  to be perfectly
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Empirical studies of the welfare consequences of  holding couid affect both the supply side and the
quotas often assume perfect competition  demand side, by affecting the costs of search.
everywhere. If this assumption is not valid,
welfare estimates and policy recommendations  These results accord well with their
may err dramatically. The popular press often  theoretical discussion, in which they point out
argues that market power is being exercised in  that license use and price paths with imperfect
markets constrained by import q, otas.  competition in the license market may be quite
different from the corresponding paths in the
Krishna and Tan develop a framework for  case of perfect competition - even though the
testing the hypothesis of perfect competition in  total use of licenses is the same.
the market for appa.el quota licenses. Drawing
on simple models, they predict the behavior of  They estimate the structural demand and
license prices, taking into account four  supply equations of the model, which provide
influences on prices: scarcity value, option value,  further evidence of imperfect competition in the
renewal value, and asset value. They explore the  license market. In particular, the intra-year path
effect of imperfections in the license market on  of quota license prices and of quota use are
license price paths.  found to be affected by concentration in license
holdings.
They test allegations that there is price fixing
in the market for Multi-Fibre Arrangement  The results, in short, suggest that market
(MFA) apparel quota licenses in Hong Kong.  power exists in Hong Kong's quota license
(Hong Kong often serves as a benchmark case  market. Hong Kong is often considered the
for the welfare consequences of the MFA.) They  prime example of perfect competition, so this has
use monthly data on license prices and use rates  major implications for other developing
to test for the presence of imperfect competition.  countries.
They argue that a concentration of license
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Quotas and other nontariff barriers have become important restrictions on  the exports of
developing countries. Economists  have long been concerned about the increasing use of these
measures  since they lack transparency  and are frequently  used to discriminate  between  suppliers.
While some  indication  of the restrictiveness  of a system  of quotas  can be obtained  where markets
in quota licenses exist, there are relatively few open markets for quotas and prices in these
markets are volatile.
In  recent  research, Kala Krishna and Ling Hui Tan have highlighted another potentially
important consequence of  nontariff barriers.  They  can  have major implications for the
competitive  structure of markets and hence for the distribution  of quota rents.
In the two studies included in this paper, Krishna and Tan explore an additional  consequence  of
import quotas: their implications for the  dynamic behavior of  import quota prices.  An
understanding of this behavior is essential if the behavior of quota license prices is  to be
understood.  Without it, economists are unable to be confident that their assessment of the
consequences  of an import quota system are soundly based.
The first study in  this Working Paper provides a  quite general theoretical framework for
analyzing the dynamic behavior of license prices.  This framework  takes into account  common
features of such licenses, including their applicability  for a specific  period and "use it or lose
it" provisions,  but is quite general with respect to commodities. The second study draws on this
theoretical framework to specify an empirical model of one of the most important cases of
import quotas; those imposed on exports of apparel from developing  countries  under the Multi-
fibre Arrangement.
Further work on  this topic is in progress and we expect that it will ultimately lead to  a
substantial  improvement  in our understanding  of this important topic.
Ron Duncan
Chief
International  Trade Division
World BankI.  LICENSE PRICE PATHS: THEORY'
1.1. Introduction
In a static, perfectly competitive  model, it is well understood  that a quota license has a
scarcity value. This arises because a binding quota raises the domestic price of the restrained
good above the world price, creating  profits equal to this price difference  for the license holders.
The size of the price difference depends on the extent of scarcity created by the quota in the
domestic market. We call this the scarcity component  of the license price.
In dynamic settings, the license price has two additional components. Both these are
related to the property that a license is valid for an entire year. They are the asset market
component  and the option value component. A quota license can be viewed as an asset with a
life of one year. Like any other asset, the price path of the license must be such that the license
is held voluntarily. For this to occur in a world without uncertainty,  the price of the asset must
rise at the rate of interest as the latter represents the ooportunity  cost of holding the asset.
Therefore, the asset market component  predicts that the price of a license will rise over the year.
The third component  of the licernse  price is the option value component.  At any point m
time during the year, a quota holder can either use the license (by shipping the goods or by
making a temporary transfer to someone  else) or defer the license application  in the hope of a
I  We are grateful to the World Bank for research support, and to Sweder van Wijnbergen
for comments  on an earlier draft.higher price in the future if demand realizations are high. The value of a license held today,
before the state tomorrow is known, can exceed the expected price of the license at any time in
the future since a license atlows the decision on use to be deferred till the state is known. In
other words, a quota license has an "option" value.
In addition, the details of quota allocation mechanism can create other complications
which affect license prices. For example, quota allocations may be tied to past performance,
where firms with a high quota utilization  are rewarded with an increased allocation in the next
period.'  This creates a  renewal value component of  the license price.  In Hong Kong, for
example, a legal market exists for both temporary  and permanent transfers of licenses to exr.)ort
textiles  and apparel under the Multi-Fibre  Arrangement. Under a permanent transfer, the seller
reinquishes the use of the license in the current and aU future periods. Under a temporary
transfer, however, the seller loses the use of the license  in the current period but retains renewal
rights. This can create negative prices for temporary transfers of licenses as pointed out by
Anderson (1987), and furher  discussed  in Eldor and Marcus (1988).
The paper is organized  as follows. Section 2 pros Jes some theoretical foundations  for
the different components  of the license price, namely the scarcity  component, the asset market
component,  the option value component,  and the renewal  component.  Section 3 relates our work
to the existing literature. Section 4 contains some concluding  remarks.
2L.2. Some Simple Models
Jr. this section, we present some simple models which help to  explain the  forces
underlying license price paths duding the quota period. We will first present a simple model
which focuses on  the  option value component. Next,  we use this model to  look  at  the
implications of  "use-it-or-lose-it"  restrictions on  the pdce  of  temporary versus permanent
transfers. We  then argue that this model is a  very special one and that the option value
component  disappears  in interior solutions  when the license pdce is made endogenous.  FinaUy,
we consider the license utilization  path when there is strategic inte.action between the L;cense
holders.
Model 1:
Let us consider trade between the U.S. and Hong Kong. We assume, for simplicity, that
there are no transport costs or tariffs, and that thie  quota is imposed on a homogeneous  good.
We further assume that the U.S. price of the good in question  can take on only two exogenously
given values: ae (high price) and aL  (low price). This would be t!he  case if demand in the U.S.
is uncertain  and if Hong Kong supply is such a small part of total supply to the U.S. market that
any change in the supply from Hong Kong would not affect the U.S. pdce.
Similarly, we assume that the supply price from Hong Kong is exogenously  given and
fixed at S. In other words, we are assuming  that the U.S. market is a small enough part of the
total sales of Hong Kong that changes in supply to the U.S. do not affect the supply pdce in
Hong Kong. This assumption  of infinite elasticity  of supply and demand is a crucial one since
3it makes the value of using a license in any state an exogenous  variable. Thus, if U.S. demand
is high 2, the value of using a license is LI  = aH  - S; if U.S. de.-nand  is low, the value of using
a license is LL = aL- S. Let a'  >  aL, and assume that LL >  0, that is, S <  aL.  The scarcity
component of the license price is reflected  in these values. It is due to the presence of trade
restrictions that there exists a difference in the U.S. demand price and the Hong Kong supply
price for this good. The more rttrictive  the trade policy is, the greater this difference  will be.
Suppose the quota  1cense  is valid for three time periods. At each point in time, there is
a realization  of demand, either high or low, which we call the "good" state and the "bad" state
respectively. The  "good" state (denoted by  the  superscript H)  is  assumed to  occur with
probability T and the "bad" state (denoted by the superscript L) with probability (l-w). The
expected value of using a license in any given time period is therefore a constant and equals
E(L) where:
E(L)  =  rLH + (l-r)LL.  ()
After the state is realized, the holder of a license decides whether or not to use the
license.  The stream of choices and values is depicted  in Figure 1. As usual, the system  is solved
backwards. In Period 3, if the license is not used, the payoff is zero. If it is used, the payoff is
the value of the T 'cense in the state realized. Since we assume that both LH  and LL are non-
negative, all available licenses will be used in the final period. The expected license price in
Period 3, E(L 3), is thus E(L).
4If Period 2 is a good state, all the licenses will be usec., -ince Lx >  8E(I<)  where 8 is
the discount factor. If Period 2 is a low demand state, the.n  dS long as a is not too small, so that
LL <  6E(I3), none of the licenses will be used. 3 The lowest price at which any transaction will
occur is 6E(L 3) and this is the value of owniag a license in the low demand state, not LL. If the
discount factor is small enough, licenses will be used in both states. Tius, at the be.ginning  of
Period 2, before uncertainty about the state of nature is resolved, the value of a license will
equal E(L2), where:
E(L 2)  =  L  + (1  -))max(1,S  8E(L3)).  (2)
Similarly  in Period 1, if a good state occurs, all the licenses will be used since LI  >
6E(LW).  If a bad state occurs and LL  <  6E(L), no licenses  will be used but the value of a license
is E(),  and not LL.  If LL  >  8E(L2),  then all licenses  are used and the value of a license is LL.
Before uncertainty  is resolved in Period 1, therefore, the expected  value of a license, E(L 1), will
be given by:
E(L,)  - 1rLR  + (1-ir)max[LL, 8E(L)].  (3)
The option value arises because the license holder can defer a decision  on whether or not to use
the license until after the uncertainty  is realized. Deferriing  this decision has no value if there
is no choice left as tc whether or not to use the license, or if the optimal  decisions  are not state-
contingent so that the choice is effectively worthless. For example, one reason why decisions
may be state-independent  would be if the discount factor is so small that periods in effect
5FIGURE 1:  Dedsion Tree for Quota Utilizatlon  In a Three Period Model
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separate,  and all the  licenses  are used  at the  beginning,  irrespective  of the demand  state.  Another
reason,  explored  later, is that  endogenous  forces  may make  both  using  and not using  the license
equally  attractive.
In Period  3, using  the license  is the only sensible  choice  so there is no option  value  to
a license.  In Periods  1 and 2, however,  it may  be valuable  to be able  to defer  decisions  on use
6until after the uncertainty  is resolved.  If the optimal  strategy  involves  such  a state-condngent
choice  (e.g., holding  the license  in bad states  and using  it in the first  good  state),  then  an option
value  component  exists.
The option  price component  at any given  period  is given  by the difference  between  the
expected  license  price  before  the resolution  of vncertainty  and the expected  license  price  before
the resolution  of uncertainty =  to ti  The
latter price is given  by E(L). Thus, the option  price component  equals  E(L 1) - E(L) in Period
i for i=1 or 2; there is no option  price  component  in Period  3.
Note that the license  price falls over time. This is because  the option  price component
falls over time.  For example,  with  N periods,  d  = 1, and LL  = 0, the value  from holding  on to
a license  in a bad state  at time t equals  LI times  the probability  that at least  one good  state  wiU
occur in the remaining  periods. This equals  LI times  one minus the probability  that all the
remaining  periods  have  a bad state  realized.  This value  falls  over time.
For N = 3, 5 e (0,1), and  LL=  0, E(L)  equals  1LH.  Also:
E(LI)  - iL'{1  +  I  (1-.f)  +  [8(1-,O12}.  (4)
The difference  between  E(L,) and E(L) is  the option value component.  This equals the
discounted  expected  value  of a good state occurrinR  some  time in the future.  Similarly,  in
Period  2:
E(L7) =  Lf  [  (1-)].  (S)
7The  difference  in this and  E(L)  is the option  value  component  in Period  2. Notice  that the option
Value  component  is greater  in earlier  periods  since  more  periods  remain  in which  the license  can
be used. In the first two periods,  the license  holder  has the option  of not using  the license,  and
this option  has value.  In the third  (terminal)  period, this option  value  disappears.
To summarize,  the option  value  component  of the license  price exists b3cause  quota
licenses  are issued  at the beginning  of Period  1 and are valid for three periods.  The value  of a
license  prior to any information  being  revealed  exceeds  the expected  price  of the license  at any
time in the future since  a license  allows  the decision  on use to be deferred  until the state  is
known.
Model  2:
Here we incorporate  the eftect of "use-it-or-lose-it"  policies  on the value  of a quota
license.  Consider  a model  analogou  - to Model  1 with two  periods  in each  quota  year, but with
the twist  that using  a license  leads  to obtaining  a new  license  in the next quota  year. Denote  the
value  of a new  license  by R.
For simplicity,  we use a two period  version  of Model  1, which  is illustratrd  in Figure
2. In Period  2 of year 1, if a good  state  occurs,  and the license  is used, the holder  obtains  the
license  price as well as the (discounted)  value  of a new  license  in the next quota  period, i.e.,
LH  + 5R; the holder  obtains  nothing  if the license  is not used. If a bad state  occurs,  using  the
license  yields LL + 8R, while  not using  the license  again  results  in zero gain.
8FIGURE 2:  Decision Tree for 4  Two Period Model
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In Period 1, if a good state occurs and the license is used, the license owner obtains LH
+ 62R. If the license is not used, we go to Period 2 and nature moves, yielding  a good or a bad
realization. The payoffs if the bad state occurs in Period 1 are analogously  defined. Note that,
by recurrence, R must equal the value of holding  a license at t= 1 before uncertainty  is realized,
denoted by E(L,).
9The problem is then solved backwards  as usual. Since a license can always not be used,
R 2  0. In the last stage, therefore, licenses are always used as long as LL + SR >  O. We will
assume for the time being that this is so. Irrespective  of the realization  in the first period, the
value of holding a license in the second period before the state is realized is denoted by E(L2)
where:
E(L 2)  =  C(LR  +  8R) +  (1I6)(LL  +  ()
= E(L) +  8R
where E(L) is defined as before in Model 1 as:
E(L) = iL  + (1I  -)LL.  (7)
If a good state occurs in Period 1, the license is always used as LI +  52R >  6E(L2).  If a bad
state occurs in Period 1, the license will be used if LL +  52R >  E( 2) , i.e.,  if LL >SE(L),
or b  <  LL/E(L). If LL >  BE(L), the license will not be used. Thus the value of a license is
equal  to max[LL  +  52R,  6E(L2)].  This gives:
E(L 1)  =  (L  + 82R) + (1-n)bE(L,)
= E(L) + 82R + (1 - )[8E(L)-LLI],  j  2  ELL
E(L1 )  = E(L)  + 8 2R,  L
Note that if a is large, E(L) contains  an option  value component,  which is the difference
between E(Lj) and the best that can be obtained from choosing  a given time to sell. The option
value component is given by (1-T)[RE(L)  - LU];  thus, it is equal to the probability of a bad
10outcome in Period 1 times the gain from waiting in the event of a bad outcome. If a is small,
no option value component  exists as aU the licenses wiU  be used up in Period 1 irrespective  of
the state.
Using the fact that E(L 1) =  R, we can solve for R:
[E(L)J  +  (l-x)[6E(L)  - LL]  ff  LL
E1 -)2s  1 _  2  E(L)
Note that R contains an option value component  if a is large. However, this is not the case if
3 is small, as the new license will be used up in the first period of the next quota year. From
(6) and (9):
(~L~)  =  (18  +  )EBL) + 8(1  -n)[8E(L)-LI]  if 8  LL
E(L 2) =)L),  if8  EL
-82  E(L)
If 8 is large, an option value exists even in Period 2 since it enters E(L2)  through the renewal
value component, R!
Now consider the case where LL <  0,  so that 5 >  LL/E(L). Consider the price for a
temporary  transfer of a license. It is easy to see that this could be negative!  If a transfer is made
11after  the state  is realized,  say  in Period  2, and it is a bad state,  the price of license  must  be such
that using  it yourself  is as good as selling  it at price  pT.  Selling  it yields  pT  +  5R  in Priod 2
and not selling  it yields  LL +  BR.' Thus,  pT  =  LL  <  0.  Note  also that a permanent  transfer
would  entail a choice  between  selling  it for PI and using  it yourself  which  yielO&.:  max[O,  LL
+ 8R].  The  price of a permanent  transfer  must  be such  that these  are equal. Thus,  PI must  be
non-negative.  Note that in addition,  the difference  between  the price of a permanent  and
temporary  transfer, (PI - PI), equals  AR  or the present  value in Period 2 of renewal  rights. 7
Thus, while temporary  transfers  can be associated  with negative  prices, permanent  transfers,
which  are a transfer  of the license  and the renewal  rights,  cannot  have  negative  prices.
Finally,  some  indication  of the extent  of the option  value  may  be inferred  from estimates
of the interest  rate and the difference  in temporary  and permanent  transfer  prices. Temporary
transfers  have  a price  of E(L)  on average.  If there  is no option  value,  the difference  in the price
of temporary  and permanent  transfers  of licenses  equals  the present  discounted  value  of future
license  price realizations  E(L)/(1-6).  If renewal  rights  have an option  value, X, the value  of
renewal  rights  rises, to [E(L) + XJ/(1-8).  Thus:
pp  _ pT  =  [E(L)+X]  _  X = (PP -PI)(I  - 6 )  - E(L).  (11)
Average  license  prices  for  temporary  transfers  can  be used  as a proxy  for E(L)  and the discount
factor  can  be proxied  for using  information  on interest  rates.
12There are of course many  problems  with this approach. The implementation  scheme  may
be quite complex and not all relevant components will be captured in such simple models.
Moreover, the scarcity value of quotas is not fixed over time as assumed here. Not only are
there swings over time in the use value of licenses with cyclical  conditions  and the entry of new
supplier countries, but the quotas may be renegotiated.  In fact, the MFA itself is likely to be
phased out!
Model 3:
The assumption  that the gain from using a license in any state is exogenously  given is
a  very  special  one.  Consider  now  a  model where,  for  example, (small) Hong  Kong
exporter/license holders face a  given, infinitely elastic US demand for their product. For
simplicity, let their inverse export supply curve be given by the linear function:
PS  =  OQS  (12)
Suppose the only source of uncertainty  is U.S. demand, which can be in either one of two
possible states:
pD  =  aH  if demand is high,  (13)
pD  =  aL  if  demand is low,
where  aL <  aH. As before, the high demand state occurs with probability x,  and the low
demand state with probability (1-i).
13The model consists of two periods. V licenses are issued at the beginning of the first
period and they are valid for two periods. We assume that the quota is binding  even in the low
demand period, so that V 5  aLlO.  License holders behave in a perfectly competitive  manner.
Consider the second period first. Suppose  there are V 2 licenses left over from the first
period, where V 2 <  V. All the V 2 licenses will be used since this is the last period. If the
second period Is a high demand period, the license price will be the difference  between  the high
demand price in the U.S. and the price in Hong Kong when V 2 units are supplied:
=  a  - 2O  (14)
and if it is a low demand period, then the license price will be:
4=aL  -v 2 . (15)
The expected Period 2 license price is therefore:
E(L21V2)  = uL  + (l  )L-  (16)
=  iraH  +  (l:)aL  - OVJ
at the beginning  of Period 2. Notice that the more licenses are remaining  in Period 2, the lower
will be the actual and expected Period 2 license price. This reflects the scarcity value of the
license. This is depicted in Figure 3 -- with °2  as the origin for V 2, the expected value of
licenses falls as V 2 increases.
Now fold the problem back to Period 1. If license holders are perfectly competitive,  then
the value of using tne license must equal the value of not using it. Exactly  enough licenses will
14be used in Period 1 in each state so that the Period 1 license price is equal to the discounted
value of the expected Period 2 license  price, where the discount factor is given by a  = 1/(1  +r).
In other words, VIH  and VIL are chosen so as to satisfy:
aH  - 6VjR  =  SE(L 2 I V2 = V- VI") if Period 1 demand is high,  (17
aL  - GVIL  = 6E(L 2 V  1=  V-VI')  if  Period  1 demand  is  low.
In Figure 3, 0  is the origin for VI. The equilibrium  Period 1 utilization  and license price is thus
FIGURE  3:  Quota Utilization  in a Competitive  Market
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15given by the intersection  points in Figure 3. It is easy to solve the equations  (17) for the
equilibrium  Period 1:
va  =  1  (aH  - 8A  + 8V)  ;f Period  demand is high
0(1 -8)  (18)
[VL  =  (  (aL  - 8A + aeV)  if Period 1 demand  is low
and the equiLorium  Period  1 license  price:
8  ,a Li  =- 1(a  +A-  V)  if Perioddemand  i  .gh
(19)
(a L  + A  - OV)  (f Period 1 demand is low 1+8
where  A =H  +  (1-w)aL.
Therefore,  the expected  license  price in Perir4 1 is:
E(Ld) =  + (1 -i)Lt  (20)
and from (17), it follows  that the expected  Period  2 license  price at the beginning  of Period  1
is simply:
Since  a  <  1, it is evident  that E(L 1)  <  E(LW),  that is the ex ante  expected  license  price rises
over time if the discount  factor is less that one. According  to this simple  model, the rate of
growth  of the license  price, (1-5)15,  equals  the rate of interest  if there is discounting.  If there
16E(L2) = 1 E(L I  V2=V-  *)  + (1 - x)E(L  I V2  =V-  V,)
=LIM*  +  Lt*
=  c  (21)
A  1E(L,).
is  no  discounting, then the license price  stays constant. In  either case,  the option value
component of the license price is eliminated by the equilibrating mechanisms in the license
market and only the scarcity and asset value components  remain. This result holds even if we
assume persistence  of demand states.
This simple model thus suggests  that the license price in any period is negatively  related
to the number of licenses available in that period (as evident from (14) and (15)) but that the
expected  license price is positively related to the time period and negatively  related to the quota
level (as seen from (20) and (21)). The license price is higher in good states than in bad, but in
good states, license utilization  is also high. Thus, we can infer license price fixing if the license
price rises but license utilization falls.
Note that the option price component  is missing  in this model since we assume that all
solutions  are "interior" ones. In a model  with many  possible  states, some  of which lead to corner
solutions (for example, if some states exist where even if all existing licenses are used, it is
strictly preferable to use a license rather than hold on to it) the option value component  will re-
emerge as there will be a gap between the value of using and not using a license. This option
price component  could result in license prices falling over time.
17Model 4:
Finally, let us consider the implications  of imperfect competition  in the license market.
This is made complex  by the fact that most quota implementation  procedures encourage  license
holders to fill their allotted quota. Given this aspect of the implementation  procedure, imperfect
competition  in the license market cannot restrict the supply of licenses over the entire period.
However, it can certainly  affect the chosen path of license utilization  relative to the path which
would obtain in the case of perfect competition.  Thus it can affect the path of license prices as
well.
This point can be shown quite starkly  with a slight modification  of the previous model.
Suppose  we retain the previous assumption  that there are competitive  suppliers of the restricted
product, with the supply  price given by PI = OQs  as in equation  (12); and that the U.S. demand
price is either a" (high) or aL  (low) as in equation (13). However, now suppose  there is only one
license holder who obtains the product from the competitive  suppliers and sells it in the quota-
constrained  U.S. market.
in  Model 3,  with perfectly competitive  license holders, the expected license price in
Period 1 is given by equating the value of using the license in that state with the discounted
value of holding on to the license for use in the next period, i.e.:
ad  - eV,"  =  8E(L 2 I  V- V,")  (22)
where sl  denotes the state of demand in Period 1, sl  =  H or L. The left hand side of the
equation, (a'W  -OVI'), is a negative function of V," 1 whilst the right hand side, 6E(L2  I V-VI,"),
is a positive function of VI" (i.e., a negative function of V2). In Figure 4, their intersection  at
18C" determines the equilibrium  utilization  and price (V 1HC,  L,")  if Period 1 is a high demand
state, and their intersection  at CL determines the equilibrium (V"'lc,  L,Ln)  if Period 1 is a low
demand state.
Now consider the case of a monopolist  license holder who realizes that using more
licenses (i.e., exporting  more of the quota-constrained  product) will raise the supply  price of the
product. Whereas in the competitive  case the equilibrium  Period 1 license utilization  and price
were found by equating the average revenue from using the licenses with the average revenue
from holding them for the next period, the relevant consideration  for the monopolist  license
holder is instead the marginal revenue from using the licenses in Period 1 versus the marginal
revenue fiom holding on to them. Now, in Period 1, given the state of demand sl,  the marginal
revenue from using the licenses is:
mRe, = as'  - 2evj"  (23)
and the marginal revenue from holding the licenses (i.e., using them in Period 2) is:
MR2 = 8fE, 2[a]  - 2eV2)  (24)
where s2 denotes the state of demand  in Period 2, s2 =  H or L. The license holder will choose
the Period 1 utilization so as to maintain indifference  between the two choices of action. In
Figure 4, the intersection  M" denotes the equilibrium  if Period 1 is a high demand state, and ML
denotes  the equilibrium  if Period 1 is a low demand state. The corresponding  license utilizations
and prices are (V 1 I',  L,IJ)  if Period 1 is a high demand state, and (VILM,  Li 1^) if Period 1 is
a low demand state.
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The exact location  of the equilibrium  points for the monopolist  relative to the competitive
situation depends of course on factors such as the discount rate, the relative demand prices in
the two states and the probability of occurrence  of the states. Our main point is simply that that
the utilization  and price paths of the quota licenses  are quite different  with imperfect  competition
than they are under perfect competition, even though the total utilization  is the same in both
cases.
20I.3. Some Related Work
That quota licenses can be viewed as  options is  not a  new insight. For  example,
Anderson (1987) likens a quota license to an American-type  put option, although  he notes that
the endogeniety of  license prices in  any period makes the analogy with the option pricing
literature suspect. He shows that in a world of uncertainty  licenses can have a positive price ex-
ante, even when the quota is unfilled in some states. He also considers the use-it-or-lose-it
requirement, where license holders are penalized for urrilled quotas by smaller allocations in
the next period. He points out that in this case license prices could be negative, since license
holders have an incentive to use their licenses in the current period, even at a loss, so as to be
assured of future allocations.
Eldor and  Marcus (1988) extend Anderson's analysis, drawing upon the financial
literature to  obtain an explicit formula for the  value of  a  quota license  in  a  stochastic
environment. However, we argue below that their assumptions  result in their model neglecting
a fundamental  force which drives the market and which needs to be understood.  The following
discussion uses the same model found in their paper,  with the same notation for ease of
reference.
Let p* be the world price (and the price in the exporting  country) where p* is a random
variable. Let p,q be the price in the quota rmstricted  country. This is endogenously  determined
by demand and supply conditions.  The difference  between these two prices creates the scarcity
value of a license.
21Since the license holder always has the option of not using the license, the license holder
can get a payoff of max[pe,  - p*, 01. If p,, is a constant, then as p* is a random variable, the
license becomes exactly  like a put option which gives the holder the right to sell a unit of stock
at the price pq when the random market price is p*. A clever trick in Eldor and Marcus shows
that this analogy can be exploited  under certain assumptions.
Consider the value of a license which can be exercised only at the end of the whole
period, e.g.,  at time T. Let pM  denote the equilibrium  price in the quota-restricted  market if
imports are exactly equal to the quota level. Assume  (as do Eldor and Marcus) that the demand
and supply functions  in the importing country are non stochastic. This makes pM  a function of
the quota level alone. Let pr denote the price in the importing country for zero imports, i.e.,
autarky. Of course, p.  >  pM. Now note that there are only three possibilities, which can be
summarized  by cases (a), (b), and (c) below:
(a)  p*  >  p.  > PM:
Peq  = Pas  and gives  max[pq - p*, O =max[pm  - p*, 01
(b)  Pa  P  2  PM
peq  =  p*, and gives  max[p,, - p*, 0] =  max[pM  - p*, 0]
(c)  P, >  PM  >  P:
p,q = PM,  and gives  max[p,q  p*, 0] =  max[pM  - p*, 0]
The three cases  are illustrated  in Figure 5. In case (a) the equilibrium  price is the autarky
price. However, as the autarky price is less than the world price, the value of holding a license
22is zero. Since PM  is even lower than the autarky price, the value of a license also equals the
maximum  of (PM  - p*) and zero. In case (b), the equilibrium  price is the world price so that the
value of a license is exactly zero. Since pM  is less than p*, again this license value equals the
maximum  of (pm  - p*)  and zero. In case (c) the equilibrium  price is PM  SO  that the license price
is positive and again equals the maximum  of (pM  - p*) and zero.
This is the clever trick used in the Eldor-Marcus  paper. Although  p,,q  is an endogenous
variable and depends on the realization of p*, the value of a license can be expressed as a
function of PM  and p* alone in each state. Since PM  depends only on the number of licenses
available, it is a constant. This makes the license resemble a European-style  put option.
However, in practice, licenses may be exercised  at any time during the quota period. In
extending their model to allow for this, Eldor and Marcus assume that as licenses are used up
over a year, they are replenished  to the set quota level.  This assumption  ensures the PM  does
not vary over the year and makes the problem exactly like that of valuing  an American-style  put
option!
However, this assumption  is inappropriate for a number of reasons.  First a key factor
determining the time path of licenses over the quota period is the relationship  between future
prices and current prices through the effect of  current use on  future availability. Second,
incorporating the effect of current use on future availability  and prices shows that the option
price component  is much less important  than it seems. In fact, under plausible  circumstances  as
in Model 3, it may not even exist! When it does exist, of course, this option value falls as the
23FIGURE 5:  Determination  of License Prices
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year progresses. As quota allocations are usually valid only for one calendar year, we would
expect a license to have no value at the end of the year. In addition, the Eldor-Marcus model
is not entirely appropriate in the case of U.S.-Hong Kong apparel trade, since future allocations
of licenses are irlated to current usage so that even negative prices for temporary transfers of
licenses can occur.
24I.4. Conclusion
In this paper we studied the determinants  of the price path of a quota license over its
validity  period. We argued that the dynamic  aspects  of the problem in an uncertain  environment,
together with  the  usual policy of  rewarding high  license  utilization with  future  license
allocations, creates four components  of the license price. These are the scarciy,  option value,
asset market, and renewal value components.  By contrast, static models have only the scarcity
value. We showed that the renewal value component also has an option value element and
suggested ways of getting a handle on the option value component.
We also showed that the usual treatment of the option value component  as in the work
of Eldor and Marcus (1988)  neglects  an essential  part of the problem. Eldor and Marcus claim
that they solve the problems posed by the endogeneity  of the license price. However, they do
this by assuming that there is a constant number of licenses at al  times because licenses are
continuously  replenished as they are exercised, although the new licenses are not necessarily
issued to the current license holders. This assumption  is critical to their results since it makes
the license price in the future independent  of the number of licenses used today. If the number
of licenses in the next period is allowed to vary, the price realizations in the next period will
also vary. This endogeneity  in price is what equates the value of current exercise and holding
the asset until further information  is revealed, and this eliminates  the option price component
for .nterior solutions. Neither Anderson  nor Eldor and Marcus test their models  empirically  with
real world data as we do in the companion  paper.
25II.  APPAREL QUOTA LICENSE PRICE PATHS: EVIDENCE FROM HONG KONG 2
11.1. Introduction
The MFA, or Multi-Fibre Arrangement, is among the most important non-tariff trade
barriers  facing  developing  countries  today.  It  sanctions a  structure  of  country-  and
product-specific  quotas on apparel and textiles exported by developing  countries to developed
countries.
The MFA has been widely studied and much attention  has been devoted to its welfare
consequences.'  For example, Morkre (1984)  estimates  that U.S. clothing  import quotas  on Hong
Kong in 1980 gave rise to quota rents of $218 million, or 23 per cent of the total value of
clothing  imports from Hong Kong; Hamilton (1986) calculates  the import tariff equivalent rate
of textile and apparel quotas on Hong Kong to be 9 per cent in 1981 and 37 per cent in 1982;
and Trela and Whalley (1988, 1991) suggest global gains from the elimination of quotas and
tariffs of more than $17 billion (of which $11 billion will accrue to developing  countries) and
gains to the U.S. from the removal of quotas of $3 billion.
These estimates are based on static models which assume perfect competition in  all
relevant markets. In such models, as is well  known, tariffs and quotas are equivalent  and license
prices, when available, reflect the scarcity  induced by the quotas and equal the implicit specific
2  We are grateful to the World Bank for research support. We would also like to thank
Ronald Chan, Carl Hamilton, P.C. Leung, Peter Ngan and Yun-Wing  Sung for providing us
with data, and Carlos Ramfrez for useful discussions.
26tariff. The usual  practice in these empirical studies  is to take the quota license  price as a measure
of the wedge between import price and unit cost in the exporting country and to take the ad-
valorem tariff equivalent  as a measure of restrictiveness  of the quota. 9
In dynamic settings, the license  price has two additional  components,  both of which are
related to the property that a license is valid for an entire year. The first of these is the asset
market component. A quota license can be viewed as an asset with a life of one year. Like any
other asset, the price path of the license must be such that it is held  voluntarily. For this to occur
in a world without  uncertainty, the price of the asset must rise at the rate of interest, as the latter
represents the opportunity cost of holding the asset. Therefore, the asset market component
predicts that the price of a license will rise over the year.
The second additional  component  of the license price is the option value component. At
any point in time during the year, a quota holder can either use the license (by shipping the
goods or by making a temporary  transfer to someone  else) or defer the J; ense application  in the
hope of a higher price in the future if demand realizations  are high. The value of a license held
today, before the state tomorrow is known, can exceed the expected price of the license at any
time in the future since a license allows the decision on use to be deferred until the state is
known. In other words, a quota license has an "option" value.
In addition, the details of the quota allocation  mechanism  can create other complications
which affect the license price. For example, quota allocations  may be tied to past performance,
27as is the case in Hong Kong and most other exporting countries, where firms with a high quota
utilization  are rewarded with an increased allocation in the next period. This creates a renewal
value component  of the license price. These components  of the license price are studied in the
companion theoretical paper. Earlier theoretical work on this area includes that of Anderson
(1987) and Eldor and Marcus (1988). However, to our knowlcdge, there is no empirical work
on license price paths.
The case of Hong Kong is the most frequently  studied, one reason being that Hong Kong
quota prices are relatively easy to obtain since their quota licenses are traded on the open
market. In studying other exporting countries, whcre quota prices are harder to come by,
researchers often use Hong Kong quota prices as proxies." 0 Moreover, even when weekly or
monthly  license price data are available, the usual  procedure is to average  the license  prices over
the year since complementary  data are usually  available  only annually. This is the approach used
in Morkre (1984), Hamilton (1986) and Trela and Whalley (1988), for example.
There are two problems with doing this. First, as licenses are valid for an entire year,
and there is uncertainty, the simple static model  is not quite adequate. In such an environment,
license prices have a number  of components  as indicated  above, not just the scarcity  component
of  the  standard static model. Thus, it is not clear exactly what the average license price
represents! Second,  this averaging  procedure  effectively  discards  a huge amount  of economically
relevant information  which can be used to shed light on other interesting  questions.
28In this paper we study the dynamic behavior of license prices in a competitive  market.
We then test for deviations  from this paradigm. We base our empirical study on Hong Kong
data. Our choice is pragmatic  because of the availability  of data on licenses for Hong Kong. In
addition, licenses are relatively freely traded in Hong Kong compared to other MFA-restricted
countries, and the quota implementation  process is clearly documented.  As a result, it is the least
likely to exhibit behavior consistent  with market Imperfections.
Even so, allegations  of license price-rigging  in Hong Kong are made from time to time
in the textile trade  journals, although  the evidence  put forth to support these claims is not always
convincing. For  example, editorials in  the trade journal,  Textile Asia, claim that  "...  the
availability of  quota at  the beginning of  the year is limited by the  operations of  holders
determined  to wait till what seems the best possible  price is attained,"" 1 and as a result, "quota
price fluctuations  do not in fact reflect normal supply  and demand  but the course of manipulation
by the quota holders."" 2 Note that the first of the two quotes is not inconsistent with perfect
competition  in an uncertain  environment,  and the second  is merely  an assertion. Other  assertions
of price fixing point to high license prices as evidence. However, this could be a reflection of
competitive  responses to market conditions, such as high demand realizations, and not price
fixing. We provide the first attempt to test such claims in a coherent manner.
The paper is organized as follows. Section  2 sets  out a simple  demand and supply model
which  provides the basis for the econometric  model used.  Section  3 outlines the details of Hong
Kong's textile quota system. Section  4 discusses  the data we use. Section 5 estimates  the model
29developed  and looks at whether  there is evidence  of market  power in the license market. Section
6 summarizes  our results and makes some concluding  remarks.
1.2.  Developing a Testable Model
It is apparent from the discussion  in the companion  paper that license price paths are a
complicated  phenomenon  to model, and simply  observing  these time paths will not enable us to
draw any conclusions  about the existence  of imperfect  competition  in the license market. In this
section, we develop the model  on which our econometric  work will be based. As far as possible,
we try to capture all the theoretical  considerations  raised in the companion  paper. There are T
time periods, indexed by t =  1,... ,T, in a quota year. In each time period, there is a demand
for  and  supply of  licenses as  a  function of  their  price.  The  demand for  licenses is
straightforward. It is based on the excess demand for apparel in the importing country; i.e.,
demand in the importing country less supply from all other sources.
This is denoted by:
Z-)  -)  ()  (+  (25)
D  = D(Lie  H,  CR  R )
where:
Ln  =  License price of category i at time t.
CitHK=  Cost of production in Hong Kong for category i at time t.
R,  =  An index of retail sales in the U.S.
Hi,  =  The numbers equivalent  of the Herfindahl index of concentration.
30The expected signs of  the partial derivatives are indicated above the variables and
explained below. Demand depends on the full price of the good produced in Hong Kong. The
full price includes the price in Hong Kong, the license price, and any search costs involved in
obtaining  a license. The Hong Kong price is positively related  to the cost of production  in Hong
Kong, so that as the cost of production rises in Hong Kong, demand for licenses falls. As this
full price is inclusive  of the license price, increases  in the license  price also reduce demand.  The
numbers equivalent  of the Herfindahl index is a proxy for the number of equal sized firms that
own licenses. Thus, it provides an indication  of the extent of concentration  in license holdings.
Demand  would fall with a decrease in concentration  (i.e., an increase  in the numbers  equivalent)
if  this leads to  higher search costs, which have to be included in  the true cost of  doing
business.13
Now consider the supply side. At each point in time, a license holder must decide
whether to use the license or hold on to it for another  period. The supply  of licenses in category
i at time t is given by:
S  = S(L,  A,t,  C(6
(T-0)  (26)g 
Au is the total availability  of licenses at time t in category i. As before, C w-  denotes costs in
the exporting country, Hong Kong.
As usual, Si(-)  increases  with the current license price, L4. Supply also rises as Ad/(T-t)
rises;  this is  because an increased availability of licenses relative to  the amount of  time
31remaining lowers their expected price in the future, and this in turn lowers the value of holding
on to a license. The supply of licenses should  also rise with the Hong Kong cost of production,
given a license price, as this reduces the value of holding  on to a license. Finally, other things
constant,  supply may  also depend  on the time period, t, itself: the option value argument  predicts
that supply will be larger in later months when there is less of an option value in holding  on to
a license; on the other hand, asset price arguments predict the opposite, as in later months,
higher license prices will be required to  elicit the same supply as license holders must be
compensated  for interest forgone in holding a license." 4
In  a  competitive setting, Hlf should not affect supply. If  the license market is  not
competitive,  it is not obvious that greater concentration  would reduce the entire supply path, as
the past performance rule in the quota allocation mechanism encourages full utilization of
licenses. However, it could certainly affect the path of quota utilization over the year and
thereby raise license prices. This is discussed further below.
In equilibrium, demand equals supply:
D@t(-)=  4Si)  = U  (27)
The equilibrium level of quota utilization is denoted by  Uf. Both U;, and Li are observed
monthly. Equations (1)-(3) make up the structural form of the simultaneous  equations model.
The endogenous  variables of the system  are demand  (D.), supply  (Sjt)  and the license price (W.)
We will first estimate the reduced form of the system.  It is easy to verify that the reduced
form of the simultaneous  equation system allows us to solve for the license price and quota
32utilization  in any period as a function of the exogenous  variables in the model. This gives:
(-)~  (28))  -)(?
Li(C,  H  4  A,  t)  (28) u,4(T-t)
A  (29) Uv(djt,  Hr  k,  "  ,  t)  (9
An increase in the U.S. retail sales index, Rf, shifts Di(-)  out, raising the equilibrium
license price, L(  .), and quota utlization,  Ut(  ). If search costs are substantial, then  an increase
in H%  will shift Di(-)  in, so that Li(*) and Ua(*, fall in equilibrium. An increase in Cit'  will
shift the supply for licenses outward and the demand for licenses inward. This will lower L4(*)
and can raise or lower Ut(*). It raises Ua(*) if the supply shift effect dominates, and reduces
Ua,(*) if  the demand shift effect dominates. An increase in AI/(T-t) shifts S,(-)  outward,
reducing L.(-)  and raising U.(-).
The effect of an increase in t is ambiguous. However, it should have opposite  effects on
prices and quantities. This model provides the motivation  for the reduced form and structural
equations  we run in Section 5. In the next two sections, we describe the workings  of the Hong
Kong quota system and the data we use.
333. Hong Kong's Textile Quota System
Hong Kong prides itself on administering  an efficient textile quota system. The initial
quota allocation is historically  based. Past performance, transfers and quota level changes guide
the process by which these allocations  change in subsequent  years.
When a product category is newly brought under restraint, the quotas are allocated
according to past performance, 1' i.e.,  each company gets a quota amount corresponding  to its
share in  total  shipments of  that particular category to  the market concerned. Where the
manufacturer  and the exporter are not the same company, they each share the quota pertaining
to a shipment  on a 50/50 basis." 6 If the level of total shipments  exceeds the restraint limit, the
allocations are  scaled down proportionately. If the quota is more generous than total past
performance, then the balance  remaining is put into a "free quota pool", which is open to any
firm registered with the Hong Kong Trade Department  and which has documentary  proof of an
overseas order.
Quota holders are allowed to transfer a part of their quota to other firms. There are two
types  of quota transfers:  permanent  transfers, in which  the transferee  obtains  the use of the quota
for the year in question and, based on its performance  against the transferred amount, receives
a quota allocation in the following  year; and temporary  transfers, in which the transferee  obtains
the use of the quota for the year in question, but the performance  against  the transferred quantity
is attributed to the transferor. In order to allow sufficient  time for the transferee to obtain the
quota, transfer applications  are not normally  accepted  after the middle  of November. Free quotas
are not transferable.
34Under Hong Kong's textile quota system, both the utilization rate and the amount of
transfers  are important  factors  in determining  a firm's future quota allocation.  A firm which uses
less than 95 per cent of its quota holding  will obtain an allocation in the subsequent  year equal
to the amount it used; a firm which uses 95 per cent or more of its quota holding will be given
an allocation equal to 100 per cent of its holding; and a firm which uses 95 per cent or more of
its quota holding  and does not transfer out any of its quota (on either a temporary  or permanent
basis) will be awarded an additional amount equivalent to the growth factor for that category
provided for in the restraint agreement.
In addition, a firm which transfers out 50 per cent or more of its quota holdings on a
temporary basis in a year is liable to have its quota allocation reduced in the following  year,1 7
whereas a firm which transfers in 35 per cent or more of its quota holdings  on a temporary  basis
during the year is eligible for a bonus allocation in the following  year.
Finaly,  a firm which obtains  a free quota and utilizes  95 per cent or more of it qualifies
for a quota allocation in the subsequent  year; a firm which fails to utilize at 'east 95 per cent of
its free quota may be debarred from future participation  in free quota schemes for a period of
time.
To a certain extent, unused quotas may be transferred between categories (under the
"swing  provision")  and between  years (under the "carry-over"  and "carry-forward  provisions").
35As quota  entitlements  in a subsequent  restraint  period  are based  on shipment  performance
in the preceding  period, quotas  can only be allocated  after this performance  has been fully
verified  against  shipping  documents.  This  verification  process  usually  takes  two to three  months.
In order to make  a portion  of the quotas  available  during  the first few months  of the year,
therefore,  the Trade  Department  makes  preliminary  quota  allocations  to companies.  Final  quota
allocations  are normally  made  in March  and they supersede  any pre'iminary  allocations.
All textile  and apparel exports  from Hong Kong have to be covered  by valid export
licenses  issued  by the Director  of Trade.  Export  licenses  are only  issued  to firms  which  are able
to supply  quota to cover  the consignment  in question.  Valid  licenses  are required  to bring  the
shipment  on board. An export  license  is normally  valid for 28 days  from the date  of issue (or,
where applicable,  until the end of the year, whichever  is earlier). The consignment  must be
shipped  within  this period. The final licensing  date  is the first day of December.  All licenses
covering  shipments  applied  for against  quotas  held  by a company  have  to be taken  out not  later
than this date, although  shipments  may  be effected  up to the last day of the year.
Further details  of Hong Kong's textile  quota system  can be found  in the Hong Kong
Trade  Department  publication,  Textiles  Export  Control  System.  A good  description  of the system
is also contained  in Morkre  (1979, 1984).
36IL4. The Data
Tne data utilized in  this study cover the  time period 1982-88. They are  classified
according to MFA categories. Since the quota licenses are MFA category specific, we have no
aggregation problems. We do not have information  on all categories for the entire period.
However, we believe our data are the best available and that they suffice for our purposes.
As described in the previous section, quota licenses in Hong Kong are transferable  to a
certain extent. However, there is no systematic  record of the transactions  and we owe a great
deal to Carl Hamilton at the University of Stockholm's Institute for International Economic
Studies  and Peter Ngan of the Federation  of Hong Kong Garment  Manufacturers,  who provided
us with monthly license prices for many MFA categories. Additional  information  was obtained
from Textile Asia, which frequently tracks quota license prices. The license prices (L)  are
prices for temporary  transfers and are expressed in Hong Kong dollars per dozen pieces. They
are monthly averages unless otherwise stated.
Aside from monthly  license prices, we also collected  data on monthly quota utilization,
cumulative (year-to-date)  quota utilization  and annual quota levels by MFA category. These
figures are published monthly in the Notice to Exporters Serlzs IA (MSA documented  by the
Trade Industry and Customs  Department  of Hong Kong. The quota level (Vj,  monthly quota
utilization  (U;,)  and cumulative  quota utilization  (EU,) are expressed in dozens of pieces. From
these, we calculated the availability  of licenses for the rest of the year, A., as:
37t-1
At  = V-  t  U.  (30)
Monthly Hong Kong costs (C,jm)  were proxied by monthly wage rates in Hong Kong's
apparel sector. These were approximated  as the total monthly  payroll in that sector divided by
the number of persons engaged, using data published in the Hong Kong Montl.'y Digest of
Statistics. The state of demand in the U.S. was proxied by an index of retail sales, R&.
We obtained information  on the license allocation  in Hong Kong for the years 1982  and
1986 through 1988  from the Quota  Holders' List issued  by the Textile Controls  Registry  in Hong
Kong. We computed  the numbers equivalent  of the Herfindahl index of concentration  in license
holding (Hj  for each  MFA category using these lice.nse allocation data. 18 The numbers
equivalent is inversely related to the degree of concentration. Finally, (T-t) was taken as the
number of months remaining in the year.
11.S. Testing for License Market  Imperfections
Our first approach  to testing  for license market imperfections  is to use regression  analysis
to estimate the reduced form equations  developed  in Section  3. We ran the following  log-linear
model to capture the competitive  model developed  above:"
38log(L,)  =  P0 +P  PVi(T)  + P2(T-t) + P3(T-t)2 +  3 4R+ + PHi  +  I 6H(T-t)  + P 7C&
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The data were pooled across time and categories, seven years and 22 categories  in all.
In  the  above equations, the subscript i  represents the MFA category and  the subscript t
represents the month in which the observation  was made, where t= 1,..., 12. The variable (T-t)
therefore denotes the amount of time remaining from the beginning of month t for which the
license can be used, and is computed simply as (13-t). Note that the log-linear specification
enables 12  to be interpreted  as the rate of change of the license  price. We took into consideration
the fact that the quota utilization  and license price paths over time may not be linear by including
as well the quadratic  term, (T-t) 2, as an explanatory  variable.
The variable Hi(T-t) is an interaction term to capture the effect of the concentration  in
license holdings as a  function of time. This term was introduced to take into account the
possibility  raised in Section  3 that in the absence of perfect competition,  concentration  in license
holdings could affect the time path of quota utilization. Clearly, if the iicense market were
39competitive, Hi, should have no effect on  the supply of licenses. But even in  the case of
imperfect competition, the past performance rule in the quota allocation mechanism should
ensure that Hit would not affect the entire supply path of licenses; since license holders are
penalized for under-utilization  with reduced allocations  in the following  year, they would have
no incentive to restrict the supply of licenses for the entire year in the hopes of driving up the
license price. However, as discussed in the companion paper, imperfect tompetition in  the
license market would result in  license price and utilization paths quite different from the
competitive  case. The (percentage) effect of license holding concentration  on the equilibrium
utilization  at time t is thus given in Equation (7) as Bs' + 86'(T-t).
We also scaled the variable AJ/(T-t) by the quota level, Vft,  rendering it unit-free. This
was done in order to maintain comparability  between categories in the pooled data set. This
variable captures the scarcity component of the license price. Finally, we included cate:ory
dummies,  Di, j = 1,...,21,  to permit different levels of license  prices and quota utilization  across
categories, and year dummies, Yk, k=1,...,6,  to allow for annual variations.
The results of the OLS estimation  of the reduced form equations  are given in Tables 1(a)
and l(b). Also included  in the tables are the expected  signs  of the coefficients  on the independent
variables which follow from equations (4) and (5) in Section 2.
As predicted, an increase  in availability  always reduces the equilibrium  license price and
increases the equilibrium  quantity utilized at any time t; and an increase in retail sales in the
40TABLE l(a): ESTIMATE OF REDUCED  FORM REGRESSION  (7), UTILIZATION
EQUATION
Dependent variable =  log(U;,
Independent  Expected sign
Variable  Coefficient  t Statistic  of coefficient
Constant  5.9076  3.5383^
(1.6696)
C2JIIc  0.0011  9.3284a  (?)
(0.0001)
0.0126  0.7280  (+)
(0.0173)
Aj,/[Vt(T-t)1  5.3299  5.8489a  (+)
(0.9112)
T-t  0.5054  10.87712  (?)
(0.0465)
(T-t)2 -0.0382  -13.0172'  ()
(0.0029)
H.-  0.0001  0.0189  (-)
(0.0066)
(T-t)  0.0007  1.3537d  (0)
(0.0005)
12 = 0.8588
Adjusted R 2 = 0.8511
21 category dummies and 6 year dummies  included.
Number of observations = 662
Standard errors in parentheses.
From Equation (5) for a competitive  model.
':  Significant  at the 1 per cent level.
b: Significant  at the 5 per cent level.
0: Significant  at the 10 per cent level.
d: Significant  at the 20 per cent level.
41TABLE l(b)
ESTIMATE OF REDUCED  FORM REGRESSION  (7). LICENSE PRICE EQUATION
Dependent variable = log(,,)
Independent  Expected  sign
Variable  Coefficient  t Statistic  of coefficient*
Constant  -6.3502  -3.3195'
(1.9130)
CitR  HK-0.0004  -3.0574'  (-)
(0.0001)
its  0.1143  5.7585'  (+)
(0.0198)
A,/[Vi,(T-t)J  -6.8906  -6.5994'  ()
(1.0441)
T-t  -0.0574  -1.0788  (?)
(0.0532)
CT_t) 2 0.0123  3.64808  (?)
(0.0034)
Ha  0.0014  0.1848  (-)
(0.0076)
W(-t)  -0.0011  -1.78220  (0)
(0.0006)
= 0.7720
Adjusted R2 = 0.7596
21 category dummies and 6 year dummies included.
Number of observations =  662
Standard errors in parentheses.
'From Equation (4) for a competitive  model.
': Significant at the 1 per cent level.
b:  Significant  at the 5 per cent level.
c: Significant  at the 10 per cent level.
d: Significant  at the 20 per cent level.
42U.S. tends to increase both the equilibrium license price and the equilibrium quota utilization
at time t. An increase in Hong Kong costs (as proxied by the wage per worker in the apparel
sector) lowers the equilibrium  license price as expected, and raises the equilibrium  quota
utilization -- this suggests that its effect on the supply of licenses outweighs its effect on the
demand for licenses.
The time path of  the equilibrium quota utilization is quadratic, with the utlization
increasing (at a decreasing  rate) from January until the middle of the year, after which it starts
to fall. Note from equation (7) and Table l(a) that:
S  =-p2  2p3(T - t)  - P6N  it32)
= -0.5054 + 0.0764(T - t)  - 0.0007H,
where t-=  (and T-t= 12) in January, t=2  (and T-t= 11) in February, znd so on, and H, ranges
from 12 to 65. The time path of the equilibrium license price is also quadratic but in  the
opposite direction, with the license price decreasing from January until the last quarter of the
year before it starts to increase. Again, from equation (7) and Table l(b),  we have:
a,  = -P2 - 203(T-  t)  - 6N
= 0.0574 - 0.0246(T - t)  + O.OO1H.
As discussed  in the companion  paper, the asset market component  predicts that the license price
43wlU  rise over time, whereas the option value component  predicts that the license price will fall
over the course of the year. Equation (9) shows  that with the scarcity  component  controlled  for,
the license price  path indeed reflects the influence of  the option value component in  the
beginning  of the year, with the asset market component  coming  into play towards the end of the
year.
The numbers equivalent is not  significantly different from zero in  both equations,
indicating  that search costs are not too important. Interestingly,  however, the interaction term,
H,(T-t), is significantly  positive in  the utilization equation and significantly negative in  the
license price equation. This means that an increase in license holding concentration  decreases
the slope  of the license price path, making  it fall more steeply  and rise more gradually than the
competitive  path.  4 Conversely,  an increase  in license holding  concentration  increases the slope
of the license utilization path, making it rise more steeply and fall more gradually than the
competitive  path. 2 "  This indicates  that the equilibrium  license price and quota udlization paths
are  indeed affected by  the concentration in  license holdings -- a  result which is  strongly
suggestive  of imperfect competition  in the license market.
The reduced form estimates,  therefore, suggest  that the competitive  model's implications
are not quite borne out. In order to provide  a further check, we estimate the structural equations
using two stage least squares. It is easy to confirm that using exclusion  restrictions  alone permits
identification of  our  simultaneous equations system although the  structural equations are
overidentified.  If the interaction  term enters the supply  function  in a significant  manner, we have
some evidence of imperfections  in the market.
44The structural form equations  we estimated  were:
21  6
log(D,)  a  + alog(Lf)  +  + acRA +  AM  + EDA +  EPAY  +*
log(S)  =a  +  alog(Lf)  +  a  +  +A  )  +  _(T-t)  + ac(T_t)2  +  6H 1109  2  it  SV,~T-)  +tT_4
+E  S;D,  + Ee  +E
1=1  kul (y
The results, together with the expected signs of the coefficients  from equations  (1) and (2), are
presented in Tables 2(a) and 2(b). Notice that the coefficient  on log(L,  in the supply equation
is not significantly  different from zero! A competitive  license market would predict a positive
sign on at',  with more licenses being supplied when the license price is high; hence, this
coefficient  estimate is consistent  with an imperfectly  competitive  license market, where such a
relation need not be observed. Furthermore, the interaction term  H,(T-t) is positive and
significant, indicating that  a  reduction in  the  numbers equivalent (i.e.,  an  increase in
concentration)  lowers the supply of licenses  in the beginning  of the year more than in the latter
part of the year. Again, this is suggestive  of imperfect  competition  in the license market.
The demand equation is of less interest here. It suffices to note that the coefficient  on
log(L-) is negative and significant in this equation, and the coefficient on R;, is positive and
significant, as expected. Search costs are not an important  consideration, since the coefficient
on H;, is not significantly  different  from zero. Somewhat  surprisingly, the wage variable is also
not statistically  significant  (and wrongly signed.)
45TABLE 2(a)
ESTIMATE OF STRUCTURAL  EMUATiONS  (8).  SUPPLY EQUATION
Dependent variable = log(S,,)
Independent  Expected  sign
Variable  Coefficient  t Statistic  of coefficient
Constant  6.6071  8.7585'
(0.7544)
log(L-)  0.1103  0.7195  (+)
(0.1533)
Cit  HK  0.0012  8.2762'  (+)
(0.0001)
Ak/[Vf(T-t)]  6.0910  4.4455'  (+)
(1.3702)
T-t  0.5119  11.1265'  (
(0.0460)
(T_t) 2 -0.0395  -12.3758'  (?)
(0.0032)
HI(T-t)  0.0009  2.0227b  (0)
(0.0004)
R2 =  0.854'
Adjusted R2 = 0.8471
21 category dummies  and 6 year dummies included.
Number of observations =  662
Standard errors in parentheses.
'From Equation (2) for a competitive  model.
': Significant  at the 1 per cent level.
b: Significant at the 5 per cent level.
C:  Significant  at the 10 per cent level.
d: Significant  at the 20 per cent level.
46TABLE 2(b)
ESTIMATE OF STRUCTURAL  EQUATIONS  (7). DEMAND EQUATION
Dependent variable = log(D,,)
Independent  Expected sign
Variable  Coefficient  t Statistic  of coefficient
Constant  8.4756  6.8714a
(1.2334)
1Og(Lh)  -0.7729  -6.0911'  (l)
(0.2894)
Cit  HK  0.0001  0.6689  (-)
(0.0002)
0.0479  3.6967a  (+)
(0.0130)
Hs  0.0007  0.1018  (-)
(0.0065)
=  0.7424
Adjusted R2 =  0.7297
21 category dummies  and 6 year dummies  included.
Number of observations = 662
Standard errors in parentheses.
'From Equation (1) for a competitive  model.
':  Significant  at the 1 per cent level.
b:  Significant  at the 5 per cent level.
0: Significant  at the 10 per cent level.
d:  Significant  at the 20 per cent level.
47Our estimation of both the structural and reduced forms of the simultaneous  equations
model thus casts some doubt on the existence  of perfect competition  in the Hong Kong license
market. Both sets of regressions point to the fact that the degree of concentration  in license
holdings does have a  significant impact on the time path of  the license prices and quota
utilization.
II.6. Conclusion
Our main objective  in this paper was to test the hypothesis  of perfect competition  in the
market for apparel quota licenses. Drawing  on the simple models in our companion  paper, we
attempted to model the demand and supply of licenses, taking into special consideration the
various components  affecting the license  price, such as the scarcity  component,  the option value
component,  and the asset market component.  By introducing  an interaction  term of the numbers
equivalent and the time remaining for the quota to be used, we found that the concentration  in
license holdings  had a significant  impact on the equilibrium  time paths of the license price and
quota utilization. This accords well with the theoretical discussion which points out that the
license utilization  and price paths with imperfect  competition  in the license market may be quite
different  from the corresponding  paths in the competitive  case, even though the total utilization
of licenses remains the same.
Finally, we also estimated  the structural  demand and supply  equations  of the model, and
this turned up further evidence of imperfect competition in  the license market. The supply
equation, in particular, was characterized by a statistically significant interaction  term, and a
price elasticity that was not significantly  different from zero.
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49END NOTES
1.  The operation of the Hong Kong quota system, for example, for textile and apparel
exports under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement  is documented  in Textiles Export Control
System, Hong Kong Trade Department  (Hong Kong: Government  Printer), 1987.
2..  Note that other assumptions  which result in the same license price realizations (such as
supply side uncertainty)  can also be used to motivate  the model.
3.  Specifically,  this holds as long as:
,  Lz  _L 
uLNf  +  (1-n)LL
4.  For another application  of option value see van Wijnbergen  (1985).
5.  If 6 is small enough, then  all licenses will be used ir. Period 1, even if it is a low demand
state, and  the transaction price will be LL. In  this case,  there is  no  option value
component  in any period.
6.  Note that we are assuming all temporary transfers are used. This is an appropriate
assumption  as long as the transfer  price is positive, since the only reason to buy a license
would be to use it. However, if the transfer price is negative, this need not be a good
assumption since renewal rights are not sold to the transferee and this creates a moral
hazard problem. Tranferees have an incentive to "take the money  and run". If there is
no way to ensure use, then such temporary  transfers will not be made; only permanent
ones will be made. If temporary transfers are made, then their price will reflect the
possibility of losing renewal rights and will exceed the use value of the license.
7.  Note that the difference  in permanent  and temporary  license prices is in general equal to
the present value of renewal rights as this is the only difference in these two transfer
forms.
8.  See, for example, Hamilton (1990) which analyzes the effects of the MFA and its
proposed reforms from a variety of viewpoints.
9.  This is the method  used by Morkre (1984), for example, as well as by Trela and Whalley
(1988, 1991.)
10.  For example, Trela and Whalley (1988, 1991) compute the Hong Kong supply  price by
subtracting  the quota price from the U.S. price. They then compute the production  costs
of quota-restricted  products in other exporting  countries by multiplying  the unit cost in
Hong Kong with the ratio of the exporting country's relative wage in the textile and
50apparel industry compared to Hong Kong. However, this approach assumes that the
standard competitive model is the appropriate one. Krishna, Martin and Tan (1992)
shows that this approach yields significant  overestimates  of actual license prices, casting
into doubt all welfare  calculations  based on these estimates,  as well as the standard static
model on which this procedure is based.
11.  Textile Asia, February 1989, p.11.
12.  Textile Asia, March 1989, p.  19.
13.  We could also include U.S. costs of production as an explanatory  variable since  demand
for Hong Kong apparel is defined as excess supply over supply from other sources,
including  the U.S.
14.  In a competitive  ma;  ket, U.S. costs, given a license price, should not affect the supply
of licenses, although  they could affect the demand  for licenses,  as could the costs in other
exporting countries.
15.  The reference period is usually the most recent 12-month  period for which shipment
performance  can be ascertained  prior to the introduction  of the restraint.
16.  In the case of finished piece-goods,  quotas are allocated  on a 40/30/30 basis among the
exporter, the finisher and the weaver. In the case of finished fabrics manufactured  using
imported grey fabrics, quotas are allocated on a 50/50 basis to the exporter and the
finisher.
17.  This amount was reduced to 35 per cent in June 1985, but was changed back to 50 per
cent in July of the following  year.
18.  MFA category  338/9 is further  divided  into subcategories  338/9-T (tank tops) and 338/9-
o  (other.) We have the Herfindahl  indices, quota levels and monthly  utilizations  for the
subcategories,  but license prices only for the category 338/9 as a whole. Therefore, we
had to compute  the Herfindahl index for category 338/9 by taking the weighted  average
(by quota level) of the Herfindahl indices of the subcategories.
19.  The log-linear model is simply  an approximation.  We also ran the model in linear form
and obtained essentially  the same results.
20.  Differentiating  (9) w.r.t. Hi,, we have:
LdLL
(  ) at  _
=  -P6  = 0.0011.
5121.  Differentiating  (8) w.r.t.  Hi,, we have:
(audult
ag  ~)=  -P  =  -0.0007.
52Policy  Research Working Paper Series
Contact
Tltle  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1115  Looking  at  the  Facts:  What  We  Know Ross  Levine  March  1993  D.  Evans
about  Policy  and  Growth  from  Cross- Sara  Zervos  38526
Country  Analysis
WPS1116  Implications  of  Agricultural  Trade  Antonio  Salazar  Brand&o March  1993  D. Gustafson
Liberalization  for  the  Developing  Will  Martin  33714
Countries
WPSI  1117  Portfolio  Investment  Fbws  to  Sudarshan  Gooptu  March  1993  R.  Vo
Emerging  Markets  31047
WPS1  118  Trends  In  Retirement  Systems  and  Olivia  S. Mitchell  March  1993  ESP
Lessons  for Reform  33680
WPS1119  The  North  American  Free  Trade  Rasd  Safadi  March  1993  J. Jacobson
Agreement:  Its  Effect  on South  Asia  Alexander  Yeats  33710
WPS1  120  Policies  for  Coping  with  Price  Donald  F. Larson  March  1993  D. Gustafson
Uncertainty  for Mexican  Maize  33714
WPS1  121  Measuring  Capital  Flight:  A  Case  Harald  Eggerstedt  March  1993  H.  Abbey
Study  of Mexico  Rebecca  Brideau  Hall  80512
Sweder  van  Wijnbergen
WPS1  122  Fiscal  Decentralization  In  Transitional  Richard  Bird  March  1993  B. Pacheco
Economies:  Toward  a Systemic  Christine  Wallich  37033
Analysis
VWPS1123  Social  Development  is Economic  Nancy  Birdsall  April  1993  S. Rothschild
Development  37460
WPS1  124  A  New  Database  on  Human  Capital  Vikram  Nehru  April  1993  M.  Coleridge-
Stock:  Sources,  Methodology,  and  Eric  Swanson  Taylor
Results  Ashutosh  Dubey  33704
WPS1  125  Industrial  Development  and  the  Adriaan  Ten  Kate  April  1993  C. Jones
Environment  in  Mexico  37699
WPS1  126  The  Costs  and  Benefits  of  Slovenian Milan  Cviki  April  1993  S. Moussa
Independence  Evan  Kraft  39019
Milan  Vodopivec
WPS1  127 How  International  Economic  Links  Vikram  Nehru  April  1993  M.  Coleridge-
Affect  East  Asia  Taylor
33704
WPS1  128  The  Intemational  Ocean  Transport  Hans  Jurgen  Peters  April  1993  J. Lucas-
Industry  In  Crisis:  Assessing  the  Walker
Reasons  and  Outlook  31078Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS1  129 How Policy  Changes  Affected  Cocoa  Jonathan  R. Coleman  April 1993  G. ilogon
Sectors  in Sub-Saharan  African  Takamasa  Akiyama  33732
Countries  Panos  N. Varangis
WPS1  130 Poverty  and Policy  Michael  Lipton  April 1993  P. Cook
Martin  Ravallion  33902
WPSI  131 Prices  and Protocols  in Public  Jeffrey  S. Hammer  April 1993  J. S. Yang
Health  Care  81418
WPSI  132 An Analysis  of Repressed  Inflation  Andrew  Feltenstein  April 1993  E. Zamora
in Three  Transitional  Economies  Jiming  Ha  33706
WPS1  133 Macroeconomic  Framework  for an  Ibrahim  Elbadawi  April 1993  A. Maranon
Oil-Based  Economy:  The Case  of  Nader  Majd  31450
Bahrain
WPS1  134 Managing  a Nonrenewable  Resource: Ibrahim  A. Elbadawi  April 1993  A. Maranon
Savings  and Exchange-Rate  Policies Nader  Maid  31450
in Bahrain
WPS1  135 Inflation  in Czechoslovakia,  1985-91 Zdenek  Drabek  May 1993  E.  Zamora
Kamil  Janacek  33706
Zdenek  Tuma
WPS1  136 The Dynamic  Behavior  of Quota  Kala Krishna  May  1993  D. Gustafson
License  Prices:  Theory  and Evidence Ling  Hui  Tan  33714
from the Hong Kong  Apparel  Quotas
WPS1  137 Railway  Reform  in the Central  and  Philip  W. Blackshaw  May 1993  TWUTD
Eastem  European  Economies  Louis  S.  Thompson  31005